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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA SUBMITTED
IN PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 923 (1994)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report, which covers developments relating to the political reconciliation process, the humanitarian mission, the security situation and institution-building in Somalia, is submitted to the Security Council in pursuance of paragraph 2 of resolution 923 of 31 May 1994.

2. My new Special Representative for Somalia, Mr. James Victor Gbeho of Ghana, arrived in Somalia on 1 July 1994. The outgoing Acting Special Representative, Mr. Lansana Kouyate, will stay on in Somalia until the end of July 1994 in order to ensure a smooth hand-over of responsibilities.

II. THE HUMANITARIAN MISSION

3. Progress continues to be made towards the objectives of overcoming the emergency requirement and moving into the recovery phase by improving the situation of the most vulnerable, particularly women and children, and finding lasting solutions to the plight of the refugees and the internally displaced persons. But these gains on the humanitarian front remain extremely fragile in the face of continuing insecurity and in the absence of a structured indigenous capacity to deal effectively with the welfare of the vulnerable segments of the population and to cope with natural or man-made disasters.

4. The Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) has continued to provide services of coordination, information and logistical support to the humanitarian community, while pursuing its efforts to assist in the resettlement of the internally displaced persons and promoting the implementation of small-scale community projects in priority geographical areas and sectors where operational agencies are absent.

5. The period under review was marked by the containment of a potentially catastrophic cholera outbreak and the continuation of the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons. There were, at the same time, several important setbacks, which included the interruption, for security reasons, of the activities of the World Food Programme (WFP) in Kismayo as well as those of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Afmadu and Buale and the Save the Children Fund (UK) in Mogadishu.

A. Sectoral review

Food and nutrition

6. During most of 1993, WFP provided large-scale emergency relief assistance to approximately 1.2 million people. By the end of 1993, the situation had improved with the number of beneficiaries dropping to 650,000. WFP proceeded to shift its focus from relief to rehabilitation. By March 1994, WFP was supporting 550 small-scale rehabilitation schemes. These schemes are generating employment, revitalizing the agricultural sector, reactivating a market economy and promoting food self-sufficiency. Whereas in January 1993 emergency work accounted for 100 per cent of WFP assistance in Somalia, by May 1994 it stood at about 25 per cent, with some 130,000 people receiving emergency food assistance from WFP and approximately 520,000 benefiting from WFP-assisted rehabilitation and development activities.

7. During the last few months, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has supported a total of 73 supplementary feeding centres in central and southern Somalia, assisting a monthly average of 53,000 children and women, down from an average of over 95,000 at the height of the emergency. In May, however, the number of beneficiaries of supplementary feeding started rising again because of a considerable increase in the price of food products in some regions resulting from poor harvests combined with insecurity which prevented access to markets. UNICEF is also supporting nutrition programmes, including the distribution of vitamin A supplements, to a monthly average of 40,000 children.

8. A report published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/WFP in mid-June forecasts food grain production of about 44,500 tonnes during the 1993/94 secondary rainy season, only one third of the corresponding output in the previous year, despite an increase of nearly 50 per cent in the area sown. Overall food grain production in 1993/94 is likely to be 60 per cent below the pre-civil war average. This serious setback, which is due to the failure of rains in the main growing areas, indicates a need for substantial cereal imports until the next main harvest in August. Food aid requirements for 1993/94 are estimated at approximately 343,000 tonnes. Pledges so far amount to 200,000 tonnes, leaving a shortfall of 143,000 tonnes.

Health

9. The containment of the cholera outbreak that started in early February 1994 has been largely a result of the coordinated efforts of the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF and many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Somali groups, with significant logistics support by UNOSOM II. A total of

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24,650 cases had been identified and 872 fatalities reported by the end of June. WHO is now concentrating its efforts on the north-western part of the country where the epidemic has not yet abated, while UNICEF is pursuing chlorination of water sources to prevent any resurgence of the disease and trying to change people's attitudes to sanitation.

10. During the period under review, WHO expanded its support to tuberculosis treatment programmes in Mogadishu, Belet Hawa (Gedo) and the north-western part of Somalia. WHO is in the process of supplying anti-malaria drugs, laboratory equipment and supplies to Mogadishu and Hargeisa. WHO, UNICEF and Pharmaciens Sans Frontieres (PSF) have continued to operate jointly a system of procurement and distribution of essential drugs and of primary health-care guidelines.

11. Between September 1993 and July 1994, UNICEF pursued its objective of vaccinating 142,000 children against tuberculosis and another 164,000 against four other preventable diseases, as well as 102,000 women of child-bearing age against tetanus. Despite security constraints, outreach campaigns were completed in Mogadishu North, Kismayo and the Juba Valley, and Bossasso. UNICEF is currently providing various forms of support to 24 hospitals, 105 mother and child health centres, 50 out-patient departments and more than 200 health posts, in addition to providing training to community health workers and traditional birth attendants.

Water

12. Support by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to the Mogadishu Water Supply System, which was started in June 1992 as an emergency assistance project, has been suspended as a result of recurring labour disputes resulting in threats against staff. In addition, emergency funding for this project is now exhausted and UNDP is seeking urgent contributions to allow for a continuation of supplies and services to the end of the year. Any interruption of this water supply scheme would expose up to 1 million Somalis to water-borne diseases and would make a resurgence of cholera more than likely. It would also aggravate the security situation and jeopardize stability in the Mogadishu region. Already, throughout the country, access to safe drinking water remains limited and many Somalis are forced to use contaminated water sources, leading to exposure to water-borne diseases, despite efforts by UNICEF, UNHCR, several NGOs and national military contingents to dig new protected wells, rehabilitate others and assist urban water projects.

Agriculture and fisheries

13. In preparation for the current agricultural season, FAO has distributed 300 tonnes of cereal seeds, 10 tonnes of vegetable seeds and 62,000 hand-tools in cooperation with other United Nations organizations, NGOs and national military contingents. Plant protection teams are surveying and spraying against common crop pests. In north-western Somalia, FAO has rehabilitated slaughter houses. FAO and UNDP will soon take part in a fishery development project to cover areas from Merka to Adale.

Education

14. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), with some support from UNICEF, UNHCR and NGOs, has set up two education development centres, one at Mogadishu and the other at Baidoa, which have been used since 1993 for curriculum development, the design and production of teaching materials and textbooks, and teacher-training programmes, as well as support for the establishment of a local educational authority in the absence of a proper Ministry of Education. Workshops organized for Somali teachers cover the whole country as well as refugee camps in Kenya. A Somalia Open Learning Unit (SOMOLU) was launched at the end of March 1994 and already provides in-service teacher training to 105 teachers in Mogadishu. Arrangements are being made to offer SOMOLU programmes also in Baidoa and Hargeisa. UNICEF has provided material support to some 400 primary schools throughout Somalia. New emphasis is being put on support to Koranic schools that have remained active throughout the disturbances of the past years.

Shelter and survival

15. UNDP and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) are cooperating in the formulation of a programme to support shelter reconstruction and low-cost housing in the north-eastern region of Nugal and to assist the municipality of Hargeisa in the rehabilitation of physical facilities as well as the restoration of the municipality's management capabilities.

Transport

16. UNDP, in cooperation with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and with complementary inputs by WFP, is providing management support to the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and UNDP are also providing support for the strengthening of national capacities to manage Mogadishu airport.

B. Settlement and repatriation

17. There are still nearly 500,000 Somalis living as refugees in neighbouring countries as well as an estimated 400,000 displaced within their own country, the majority of them (240,000) in Mogadishu.

18. UNOSOM II has continued to take an active part in the resettlement programme for the internally displaced, with support from the military component for overnight transit arrangements, medical screening, transport and escorts and from NGOs, WFP and UNICEF for the identification of beneficiaries, arrangements with the leaders of villages of origin and the provision of food and domestic assistance. During the period under review, a total of 15,000 internally displaced persons have been helped to return to their places of habitual residence.

19. The humanitarian programme in Somalia has lacked an organization with the necessary experience to address the pressing needs of the displaced. This has forced the UNOSOM II Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to

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assume a direct operational role. In early June, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) undertook a 10-day assessment mission to Somalia to develop a comprehensive programme for the resettlement of the remaining internally displaced persons. I welcome the initiative of IOM and urge Governments to provide the financial support needed to resolve this problem rapidly. However, not all internally displaced persons will wish to return to their previous areas of residence. UNDP has accordingly initiated consultations with the International Labour Organization (ILO) with a view to formulating a programme of employment and income-generation for displaced persons, particularly in the Mogadishu area.

20. The Liboi refugee camp in Kenya was closed on 17 June, bringing to three the number of Somali refugee camps that have ceased operations in the last six-month period. Of the 42,000 Somalis registered in Liboi, 24,000 chose to return voluntarily to their country while the remainder were transferred to another camp in Kenya away from the border. UNHCR, together with UNICEF and NGOs based in Somalia, is monitoring this self-organized repatriation and is ready to intervene to alleviate problems that may arise. Other voluntary return movements by land and sea are being planned by UNHCR with a view to supporting the repatriation of 35,000 Somalis from Kenya, another 15,000 from Ethiopia and up to 5,000 expected to return from Yemen. UNHCR has been severely hampered in its repatriation and reintegration activities in Somalia by lack of funding and had to issue a special appeal on 1 July 1994.

C. From relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction

21. Following the transfer of the United Nations Development Office (UNDO) from UNOSOM II to UNDP with effect from 1 May 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between UNOSOM II and UNDP regarding UNOSOM II's continued cooperation with UNDO, including logistical support for the preparation of regional profiles and for technical or donor missions. In May, UNDO conducted a mission to Middle Shabelle to prepare a regional profile and, in late June, a technical mission was undertaken to the Nugal region. A multidonor mission to north-eastern Somalia is planned for July. It will be recalled that in paragraph 5 of resolution 897 (1994), the Security Council approved giving priority to directing international reconstruction resources to those regions where security was being re-established and to local Somali institutions which were prepared to cooperate with the international community in setting development priorities.

22. The Somali Rehabilitation Programme funded by UNDP, with a budget of US\$ 20 million, continues its activities through Project Implementation Offices in north-western, north-eastern and southern Somalia. Subprojects are currently active in such fields as school rehabilitation, improvement of wells and boreholes and establishment of water committees, road construction, small-scale enterprise promotion through cooperatives, agriculture, fisheries, frankincense production, credit schemes and marketing of produce.

23. As already mentioned, the gains achieved in combating one of the greatest humanitarian crises remain extremely tenuous. There is genuine concern among the humanitarian organizations that their capacity to pursue the priority tasks of protecting the vulnerable, encouraging the voluntary repatriation of the

refugees, resettling the internally displaced persons and promoting a transition to rehabilitation and reconstruction will be hampered by the rapidly diminishing resources available as well as by growing security problems.

III. SECURITY ISSUES

A. Security functions performed by UNOSOM II forces

24. In the implementation of its mandate, UNOSOM II endeavours to maintain security at key installations, escort relief convoys and protect personnel, particularly in emergencies and the precarious security situations resulting, especially, from banditry. With the training of more Somali police, UNOSOM II forces are increasingly undertaking joint operations with the police, which helps to ensure Somali participation in security activities.

B. Inter-clan fighting

25. The security situation, especially in Mogadishu, has been marred recently by clashes among clans and sub-clans. The most serious of these erupted on 24 June 1994 in south Mogadishu between the Habr Gedir and Hawadle sub-clans and threatened to spread throughout Mogadishu and its environs. The Acting Deputy Special Representative issued an appeal to the parties to cease hostilities. This was widely publicized by the local press and radio stations. He also discussed ways and means of ending the hostilities with Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, and other political and military leaders, all of whom said that they agreed on the need to stop the fighting. They also said that they were willing to continue to support UNOSOM II's efforts for a comprehensive agreement to end the hostilities. It is understood that Abgal, Habr Gedir and Mursade elders have been meeting in Mogadishu to find ways of defusing the tension and restoring peace.

26. During the hostilities, UNOSOM II instituted the following security measures: (a) all UNOSOM II strongpoints throughout Mogadishu were placed on maximum alert; (b) Somali militias were prohibited from deploying "technicals", especially around strongpoint No. 7; (c) the Quick Reaction Force was placed on standby; (d) UNOSOM II Cobra helicopters flew periodically over areas of inter-clan fighting to monitor the situation; (e) movement of UNOSOM II personnel and vehicles was restricted; (f) patrolling of UNOSOM II's main supply routes was intensified; and (g) all personnel within the Embassy and University compounds were required to wear flak jackets and helmets when they moved inside these areas.

27. In addition to the deterioration in the security situation emanating from inter-clan fighting, a UNOSOM II convoy was ambushed in Mogadishu on 18 July 1994. Two Malaysian soldiers were killed and four (three Malaysians and one Italian) were wounded. During the course of the attack, 11 soldiers, including the 4 wounded, were abducted and subsequently released.

C. Impact of the deterioration in security on the provision of humanitarian assistance

28. The recurring outbreaks of inter-clan fighting that have affected Mogadishu over the last three months have brought to an almost total standstill, for almost half the reporting period, all humanitarian activities in the capital city and its immediate vicinity. This instability has also resulted in a breakdown of already tenuous mechanisms to settle disputes (particularly those related to employment) between humanitarian agencies and the local community. The Save the Children Fund (UK) has had to suspend indefinitely its activities in Mogadishu, as has UNDP at the Mogadishu Water Supply Project. Access by commercial traffic to the port of Mogadishu was interrupted for two weeks and WFP operations there have been hampered by threats against staff and large-scale looting. Access roads to the port have often been blocked by armed militias. As a consequence, WFP was able to move only 10,000 tonnes of supplies out of the port during the second quarter of 1994, less than half the quantity programmed for the period. In many cases, United Nations agencies and NGOs are obliged to engage local security personnel to guard their property which involves the risk of a return to the lawless situation which characterized the earlier phase of the crisis in Somalia.

29. In outlying areas in the southern part of the country, the situation has been more stable, with the notable exceptions of Wajid, where an expatriate staff member of Medecins du Monde (Greece) lost his life in March, and parts of Lower Juba where several incidents took place, including the killing of a UNHCR staff member in April. It is hoped that the recent Lower Juba and Absame Reconciliation Agreements will improve security in that region. Most of the major security incidents outside Mogadishu have occurred in the southern part of Somalia where there is no permanent presence of UNOSOM II troops. Their presence in other locations has helped to reduce banditry and ensure the protection not only of expatriate staff but also of Somali personnel.

30. The uncertainties concerning the future size and deployment of troops have been a source of concern for the humanitarian community. The security of, and access to, seaports and airports, the protection of offices, residences and warehouses, the capacity to escort convoys and a rapid evacuation capability are considered by the United Nations agencies and NGOs operating in Somalia to be essential to their humanitarian work. As is evident from the present report, UNOSOM II is having increasing difficulty in providing these services in some parts of the country, notably in Mogadishu itself.

IV. FORCE STRUCTURE, CAPABILITIES AND MISCELLANEOUS TASKS

A. Strength and deployment

31. The current force strength, including logistics support elements, is 18,790 as at 10 July 1994. The Force is deployed as follows:

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<u>Contributing country</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>
Australia	Movement control unit	Mogadishu	55
Bangladesh	Battalion	Afgoi	940
Botswana	Battalion	Bardera	420
Egypt	Brigade	Mogadishu Port and Airport	1 665
India	Brigade	Baidoa/Kismayo	4 920
Ireland	Transportation unit	Baidoa	90
Malaysia	Battalion	Mogadishu	955
Nepal	Security unit	Mogadishu	310
Nigeria	Battalion	Merka	700
Pakistan	Brigade	Mogadishu	6 875
	Quick reaction force	Mogadishu	170
Romania	Hospital	Mogadishu	230
Zimbabwe	Battalion Signals company	Balad/Belet Weyne	900
Multinational	Force headquarters	Mogadishu	<u>560</u>
		Total	<u>18 790</u>

32. Outside Mogadishu, UNOSOM II forces are thinly stretched. Since March, there have been considerable troop reductions in the Balad/Belet Weyne area of responsibility. There is now only a company at Belet Weyne and a battalion at Balad, with no troops deployed between those two locations in the Middle Shabelle region of Jowhar/Jalalaxi. In substantial areas, regular patrols are the only contribution UNOSOM II can make to the maintenance of security. It is also becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the required range and number of escorts for humanitarian relief and logistical convoys. These difficulties will become more acute if the security situation deteriorates further.

B. Concept of operations

33. In the light of the revised mandate of UNOSOM II approved by the Security Council, its concept of operations focuses on consolidating activities in the current area of operations both inside Mogadishu and in outlying areas. The key elements of the concept are:

(a) To secure key facilities and installations, particularly airports, seaports and lines of communications;

(b) To maintain a continuous presence in key routes and within areas of responsibility through continuous patrolling;

(c) To assist in re-establishing the Somali police through direct assistance and conducting joint patrols;

(d) To provide security for humanitarian aid convoys.

C. Miscellaneous tasks

Air operations

34. A plan is in place to re-establish Somali national civil control over Somali national airspace. There is close liaison with ICAO and progress is being made. A trust fund agreement for the collection of air navigation charges for aircraft overflying Somali airspace is being finalized and a contract with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) for the collection of funds is being prepared. Comprehensive developments have been initiated at Mogadishu airport. An airfield management team consisting of UNOSOM II military personnel is responsible for the operation of the airfield. Although the air traffic control services are currently being provided by military personnel, local civilian controllers are being trained and sufficient numbers should be available by October 1994 to enable UNOSOM II to fill only supervisory posts.

Humanitarian support

35. Humanitarian assistance provided by UNOSOM II troops covers a broad spectrum of activity, ranging from providing security escorts for humanitarian convoys to conducting specialized courses for the Somali police. Numerous community development projects have been conducted and the provision of medical aid to Somali civilians has been a priority for all military contingents. Contingents in the fertile lower Shabelle River region have concentrated on assistance to local agriculture, whereas contingents in urban areas such as Mogadishu have been supporting the development of community and vocational training projects in those areas where security conditions permit. UNOSOM II forces have assisted also in activities related to food for work projects, improvement of water supplies, resettlement of displaced persons, medical assistance, reconstruction and the provision of animal husbandry and veterinary aid.

Support to Somali police

36. The gradual transfer of security functions from UNOSOM II to the re-established Somali police force is a primary objective of the police programme. UNOSOM II is achieving this through the provision of security for police activities at key police and court facilities and providing basic training which is not available through other programmes, as well as assisting in the delivery of police vehicles, weapons and equipment. Courses in drill, weapons training, vehicle driving/maintenance and hygiene and sanitation are now being conducted by military personnel for 520 Somali police.

V. DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION PROGRAMME

37. In the Declaration of the Leaders of the Somali Political Organizations, signed at Nairobi on 24 March 1994 (S/1994/614, annex I), the Somali political faction leaders explicitly expressed their support for the concept of voluntary disarmament. In paragraph 4 of its resolution 923 (1994), the Security Council strongly urged all parties in Somalia to cooperate fully with UNOSOM II and to carry out the commitments and implement the agreements which they had signed, including those relating to voluntary disarmament. However, those commitments have not been honoured and it is evident that militias have been rearming and replenishing their weapons supplies. The number of "technicals" and vehicles with armed militia sighted near UNOSOM II compounds and strong points has increased in recent months. Somalis currently have no inclination to hand in their weapons voluntarily. Should they choose to do so, UNOSOM II is prepared to collect and safeguard all weapons handed in.

VI. DEMINING PROGRAMME

38. The demining programme has continued to expand since my last report and demining projects are wholly executed by Somali deminers. The number of demining groups has increased more than two-fold to 13 and 5 others will start shortly. There has been a similar increase in ordnance destroyed: anti-tank mines up by 60 per cent to 5,253, anti-personnel mines up two-fold to 2,223 and unexploded ordnance up two-fold to 20,150. In addition, 56 square kilometres of grazing land and 60 square kilometres of roads have been cleared of mines.

39. The environment in which demining can take place would be more secure if the reconciliation process was more successful. That would enable UNOSOM II to field more international staff to supervise and monitor demining activities.

VII. POLICE AND JUSTICE PROGRAMMES

40. The operations of the recently established Police Division, which was formerly part of the Justice Division, have as their main objective the re-establishment by the end of 1994 of a neutral and credible Somali police force with a strength of 10,000 personnel. At 8 July 1994, police recruits totalled 7,869. The Police Division has intensified its work related to the training of police personnel, the supply and use of equipment and other forms of

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logistical support, as well as the repair or refurbishment of police stations. At 8 July 1994, 96 of the 125 police stations had become operational.

41. With respect to the programme related to training, the 50 civilian police officers (CIVPOLs) contributed by Member States have been deployed in those areas of the country where security conditions permit. These include Baidoa (Zimbabwe: five), Hargeisa (Netherlands: three and Republic of Korea: two), Mogadishu (Ghana: one; Ireland: one; Italy: one; and Malaysia: three) and Bardera (Ghana: four). Deployment of CIVPOLs in Galkayo, Kismayo and Merka will proceed when security conditions permit and when accommodation and training facilities become available. An additional group of five police advisers is deployed in Baidoa, Bossasso, Galkayo and Mogadishu. More police advisers are expected to be deployed shortly in Afgoi, Balad, Bardera and Kismayo. The training team provided by the United States International Criminal Investigations Technical Assistance Program (ICITAP) was recently withdrawn temporarily from Somalia for security reasons.

42. One of the major obstacles to the implementation of the Somali police programme has been the lack of training facilities in the regions. The facilities that existed previously have either been destroyed, are in a bad state of repair or are occupied by squatters. With a view to meeting this shortage, especially in Mogadishu, ICITAP had assisted in the refurbishment of a training school within the United States Embassy compound at Mogadishu which can accommodate up to 100 trainees.

43. The Darawishta is a rapid deployment unit which will handle difficult situations in the regions involving banditry, robbery and other serious crimes. The current training of the Darawishta is expected to be completed by the end of September 1994. The trained personnel, expected to number approximately 2,000, will thereafter be assigned to the regions. The military aspect of the Darawishta training is very important if the unit is to operate effectively against crime in the regions.

44. The Justice Division is continuing with the consolidation of its work programmes in the judicial, correctional, juvenile justice, crime prevention and human rights fields. Work relating to the repair and refurbishment of 54 court houses in 28 districts is progressing, and plans for the refurbishment of an additional 38 district court houses, 8 regional court houses and 8 court houses for the Courts of Appeals are being prepared. The missions undertaken in May and June by Justice Division personnel identified 146 judges for the courts which are being re-established in Bari, Nugal, Mudug, Lower Juba, Bakool, Gedo, Hiran and Lower Shabelle regions.

45. In the correctional work programme, rehabilitation of 14 prisons in 9 regions is nearing completion. The Justice Division is liaising with the district/regional councils concerned on appointment of custodial guards for the additional prisons which are being refurbished. Training programmes for the custodial staff are scheduled to commence in July.

46. In the juvenile justice work programme, the Somali Law on the Juvenile Court and Reformatories has been translated into Italian and Somali and brief commentaries thereon are being compiled. In the correctional facilities

re-established in Somalia, attention is being paid to the specific needs of juveniles, in order to ensure compliance with the relevant international standards and norms. The Street Children Redemption Educational and Recreation Pilot Project will commence as soon as security conditions in Mogadishu permit.

47. In its human rights programme, the Division is seeking to expand its work beyond monitoring the rights of detainees and prisoners, the rights of accused persons and the performance of the police, the courts and the prison authorities. The programme will also address such issues as the rights of women and children in Somalia. Educational courses in human rights, particularly through seminars, are now being arranged. The Justice Division has now begun the deployment of its officers to the regions, in order to provide assistance to the criminal justice institutions which are being re-established. Considerable assistance is being obtained from the United Nations Volunteers.

VIII. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

48. My report of 24 May 1994 (S/1994/614, paras. 6 and 7) noted that, in the Declaration signed at Nairobi on 24 March 1994 (see para. 37 above), the Somali leaders decided to convene a National Reconciliation Conference on 15 May 1994, to elect a President and Vice-Presidents and to appoint a Prime Minister, and agreed that a Preparatory Meeting for the Conference should be convened on 15 April 1994. Both meetings were subsequently postponed owing to developments outlined in that report. These repeated delays were explained as being necessary in order to accommodate the participation of one faction from the north-west with a view to maintaining the territorial integrity of Somalia and to allow time for another faction in the north-east to resolve its leadership dispute. They nevertheless caused me considerable concern and raised grave doubts about the seriousness of the Somali leaders' commitment to national reconciliation.

49. No progress in this regard has been achieved since my report of 24 May. The Acting Special Representative has undertaken intensive consultations with the two signatories to the Nairobi Declaration, namely Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed, on behalf of the Group of 12, and General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aidid, on behalf of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and its allied factions, and has tried tirelessly to secure their agreement on a new date and venue for the Preparatory Meeting. The Group of 12, however, expressed concern about the prevailing security situation in Mogadishu and asked that the Meeting be convened in Nairobi instead. No agreement has so far been reached on either the date or venue. The date is now predicated on the conclusion of a number of regional and clan meetings and consultations that are claimed to be a crucial prelude to national reconciliation. These include the Lower Juba Regional Reconciliation Conference (held at Kismayo from 24 May to 19 June 1994); the Absame Reconciliation Conference (held at Doblely from 26 June to 9 July 1994); and the Congress of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which is expected to be convened shortly with a view to resolving the dispute within the leadership of that party. The timetable agreed in March has already slipped by over three months and there is no clear indication of when the Preparatory Meeting, let alone the Conference itself, will take place.

50. The Lower Juba conference resulted in the signing by representatives of the 19 clans and sub-clans in that region of an agreement on 19 June 1994 which called for a general cease-fire to take effect in the region from 24 June 1994, the opening of all roads, campaigns of public awareness, the restoration of property to its rightful owners, the safety of the personnel and property of United Nations agencies and NGOs and the establishment of a system of administration for the region, as well as judicial organs and a prison system. Four committees were set up to oversee the implementation of the Agreement. On 19 June 1994, General Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan" and Mr. Osman Atto, on behalf of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and SNA respectively, signed a statement pledging the support of their factions for implementation of the agreement. This was particularly significant because the conference had left it to the faction leaders to finalize arrangements relating to the cantonment and rehabilitation of militia members. The statement endorsed the conference's decision to make Kismayo a weapon-free zone.

51. The Lower Juba conference left the door open for the Absame sub-clans who were absent from the conference to join in the implementation of the agreement after the conclusion of their own intra-clan negotiations in Doble. The Conference, attended by 500 delegates representing 11 Absame sub-clans, opened on 26 June 1994 in an atmosphere of celebration as the delegates welcomed a large number of refugees who had returned from Kenya in anticipation of the peace and stability they expected to result from the Lower Juba and the Absame conferences.

52. The Absame conference concluded on 9 July 1994 with the reading of an Absame Accord which, inter alia, set up mechanisms for the re-unification of the SPM and SPM (SNA) and for the peaceful settlement of property disputes, and called for reconciliation between the Absame and other Somali communities, security for humanitarian agencies operating in Absame-controlled areas, and the establishment of courts, a prison system and a police force. In addressing the closing ceremony of the conference, my Special Representative underscored the need for the Absame community to enter into dialogue with other communities and to arrive at accommodative arrangements with the signatories to the Lower Juba peace agreement as part of the process of national reconciliation.

53. UNOSOM II has continued to assist in the setting up of district councils. Two additional district councils have been established in Las Koreh and Dahar in the Sanaag region since the signing of the Nairobi Declaration in March. This was the first time that people from a region located in "Somaliland" had invited UNOSOM II to assist them in establishing their local administrative structures. The number of district councils established to date now stands at 57 (out of a total of 92). 1/ The number of regional councils remains at 8 out of a total of 18.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

54. The present report has described UNOSOM II's continued efforts to improve the overall situation in Somalia, which is now significantly better than when UNOSOM was first deployed but worse than at the time of my last report on 24 May 1994. In many regions daily life is returning to normal and agricultural

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production is recovering. Progress is being achieved in the rebuilding of institutions, especially the police and the judicial system. These achievements are grounds for hope that the Somali people can resume normal lives after the hardship that they have suffered over the last several years. On the other hand, there has been a significant deterioration in the security situation, especially in Mogadishu, due both to a resumption of inter-clan fighting and to a further increase in banditry; and the national reconciliation process is advancing at a pace so slow that there is little or no reason to believe that the target of completing the process by March 1995 can be achieved.

55. Responsibility for this state of affairs rests squarely with the Somali leaders. Such progress as has been achieved cannot be consolidated, or further progress made, until the many factions in Somalia, and especially their leaders, decide to work seriously together to reach a durable political settlement that can ensure stability in their country. In this respect, the repeated postponement of the National Reconciliation Conference and its Preparatory Meeting raises serious concern and disappointment among those who have done so much to help Somalia. Regional conferences such as that in Lower Juba can help to reduce insecurity and can contribute to national reconciliation but their achievements will be of little significance if the current tendency for a further fragmentation of factions is not reversed.

56. In these circumstances, the international community's growing concern about how long it will be expected to support efforts towards national reconciliation in Somalia is fully understandable. The repeated postponements of conferences, the emergence of new subgroups and the lack of a clear reconciliation process have created the impression that talks between Somali leaders at various levels could continue indefinitely. The impression is also created that, despite the prolonged suffering of the Somali people, certain Somali leaders are still not prepared to subordinate their personal ambitions for power to the cause of peace and stability in Somalia.

57. I would accordingly like, once again, to stress to the Somali leaders that the international community has dedicated substantial resources and shown great patience in the hope that it can help to re-establish Somalia as a society that is both peaceful and self-reliant. But this commitment cannot continue indefinitely in a world where there are so many situations of conflict and human suffering that call for the international community's attention. It is essential that Somali political leaders redouble their efforts to reach agreement on a basis of pluralism and mutual tolerance so that the international community can regain confidence that it will be able to complete its mission in Somalia by March 1995.

58. Meanwhile, I have asked my new Special Representative to prepare an in-depth assessment of the prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia. I have also decided to undertake a comprehensive review of the current troop strength of UNOSOM II. It is not clear to me that the present situation in Somalia permits the force to make a sufficiently effective contribution to the maintenance of security to justify its present size and cost. More than half of the force is currently located in Mogadishu but, through no fault of its own, it has been able to do little to mitigate the security consequences of major outbreaks of inter-clan fighting there. UNOSOM II's success in this area has

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been achieved by diplomatic rather than military means. I am inclined therefore to think that it may be feasible to commence a reduction in the level of troops at present assigned to UNOSOM II. I accordingly intend to dispatch shortly a special mission from Headquarters to discuss the extent of such reduction with my Special Representative and the Force Commander and to present specific recommendations to me. The Mission will, of course, pay special attention to the views of the humanitarian agencies and NGOs. The essential tasks of ensuring the security of UNOSOM II personnel and humanitarian assistance programmes and personnel will remain a high priority in any reconfiguration of the military component of UNOSOM II, especially in the light of the recent ambush of UNOSOM II forces referred to in paragraph 27 above.

59. It is also, of course, essential that sufficient resources are made available to make it possible for the humanitarian agencies and NGOs to maintain their efforts. I urge the international community to increase its financial support for their programmes in the coming months.

60. I have continued to exchange views on the situation in Somalia with the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) with a view to furthering our cooperation in the search for lasting peace in that country. I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express my appreciation to the three organizations for their cooperation with and support for the United Nations efforts in Somalia.

61. In conclusion, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Mr. Lansana Kouyate who, as Acting Special Representative, has demonstrated exceptional devotion and skill in his efforts to move Somali leaders towards compromise. I have every confidence that his successor, Mr. James Victor Gbeho, who assumes his responsibilities at a critical stage, will use his long experience to facilitate the negotiation of a durable political settlement in Somalia. I also would like to express my deep appreciation to the Force Commander, General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar, to all civilian and military personnel in UNOSOM II, United Nations agencies and NGOs, as well as to their Somali colleagues, for the courage and commitment they continue to demonstrate in fulfilling their tasks in this complex and hazardous mission. Lastly, I wish to pay tribute to those individuals of UNOSOM II and humanitarian agencies and NGOs who made the ultimate sacrifice in their efforts to ease human suffering and restore peace to Somalia.

Notes

1/ The legal status of several districts is still the subject of discussions between UNOSOM II and local Somali communities. As a result, the total number of districts described as existing in Somalia may vary.
